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Abstract
In this paper we study U.S. wheat farmers’ willingness to pay for near infrared
(NIR) sensor that can segregates wheat grains according to their protein concen-
tration. We ﬁrst develop a microeconomic optimization model of wheat farmers’
segregating and commingling decisions. Then we use U.S. wheat prices and stocks
to estimate a wheat protein stock demand system. This allows us to establish the
effects of changes in the protein proﬁle of wheat stocks on protein premiums. The
paper’s simulation section combines the results from the microeconomic optimiza-
tion model and from the econometric estimations to simulate wheat farmers’ WTP
for the sorting technology. Preliminary ﬁndings from the simulation show that a typ-
ical hard red winter (hard red spring) wheat farmer’s WTP for the sorting technology
is 5.6 (4.8) cents per bushel.
Key words: information, economic value, wheat, protein, market structure.
JEL classiﬁcation: Q12, Q16, D81.
21 Introduction
Wheat is the world’s second largest crop by average annual (1990-2009) production. The
average annual wheat production over 1990 to 2009 is 593.45 million metric tons.The
U.S. is the third largest wheat producer which produces about 10% of world production.
ThetoptwowheatproducersintheworldareChinaandIndia, whichrespectivelyproduce
about 17% and 11% of world wheat production. The top twenty countries produce about
86% of total world wheat.1
Protein concentration is one of the major factors that affect prices of wheat and barley.
For wheat that is used to produce bread or pasta, higher protein concentration is preferred
due to the favorable end-use properties added by the higher protein level, and hence
higher protein wheat often receives protein premiums. For example, U.S. Wheat As-
sociates (http://www.uswheat.org) and Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) at USDA
(http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/) report wheat prices based on protein concentra-
tions. Like U.S. wheat markets, wheat markets in other major wheat countries pay pro-
tein premiums as well. In China and France, protein levels directly determine the grading
of wheat (Tab. 37 and Tab. 58 in Popper, Sch¨ afer, and Freund, 2007). In Canada, No.
1 Canada Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat and No. 2 CWRS wheat are often sold
at different protein levels (p50, Popper, Sch¨ afer, and Freund, 2007). Australian Wheat
Board (AWB) has maximum or minimum requirements for wheat protein levels for its six
main wheat grades (Tab. 28 in Popper, Sch¨ afer, and Freund, 2007). India also has such
requirements for its ﬁve classes of wheat (p86, Popper, Sch¨ afer, and Freund, 2007). In
Argentina, wheat experts proposed to further divide wheat classes by protein levels (p94,
Popper, Sch¨ afer, and Freund, 2007).
1Data source of this paragraph: Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations
(http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor), accessed on October 19th, 2010.
3A new technology named near infrared (NIR) sensor makes sorting wheat grains ac-
cording to their protein concentrations possible (Long, Engel, and Siemens, 2008). If the
sorting technology is widely adopted by wheat farmers, then one should expect that the
supply of wheat with favorable protein concentration levels will increase. Given that the
demand is unchanged, the protein premium will be negatively affected by the sorting tech-
nology. The purpose of this article is to study wheat farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP)
for the sorting technology. To fulﬁll the purpose we ﬁrst develop a microeconomic opti-
mization model of wheat farmers’ segregating and commingling decisions. Then we use
U.S. wheat prices and stocks to estimate a wheat protein stock demand system. This al-
lows us to establish the effects of changes in the protein proﬁle of wheat stocks on protein
premiums. The paper’s simulation section combines the results from the microeconomic
optimization model and from the econometric estimations to simulate wheat farmers’
WTP for the sorting technology.
Our analysis focuses on Hard Red Winter (HRW) wheat and Hard Red Spring (HRS)
wheat, which account for about 64% wheat production in the U.S. Initial wheat stocks
are important to determine WTP since they affect wheat price schedules. We simulated a
normalized WTP (i.e., WTP for a sorting service which sorts wheat production from 100
acres every year and for 10 years). For HRW wheat, results show that if we take sets of 10
year continuous historical data and use them as wheat stocks facing HRW wheat farmers,
then the normalized WTP ranges from from 1;821to2,273, depending on which 10-year
data we excerpt from the data set.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop a conceptual model of a
typical wheat farmer’s optimal segregating and commingling decisions facing various
protein premium schedules. Section 3 estimates a wheat protein stock demand system.
Section 4 simulates the WTP of wheat farmers’ for the sorting technology. Section 5
4concludes.
2 Conceptual Model
In this section we develop a microeconomic optimization model of a wheat farmer’ segre-
gating and commingling decisions according to wheat protein concentrations. The goal of
the wheat farmer is to maximize the proﬁt from selling her wheat by optimally segregat-
ing and commingling her wheat given the protein premium schedule and the distribution
of protein concentration of her wheat. At this moment we assume that segregating and
commingling costs are zero. Therefore, the proﬁt maximizing goal is equal to maximizing
the revenue from selling wheat.
Processing wheat with various protein levels is different from processing wheat with
various dockage rate. Since protein is part of wheat kernels, protein within one load of
wheat does not have linear separability that dockage has. For example, 1,000 bushels
of grain with average 10% protein level cannot be segregated into 900 bushels of zero
percent protein wheat and 100 bushels of 100% protein wheat. This means that the segre-
gating result will be constrained by the distribution of protein concentration in one load of
wheat. For instance, if 1,000 bushel of 12% protein wheat is a mix of 500 bushels of pure
10% protein wheat (imagine that each grain of this 500 bushels contains 10% protein) and
500 bushels of 14% protein wheat (imagine that each grain of this 500 bushels contains
14% protein). Suppose the farmer segregate this 1,000-bushel load into 1,000 one-bushel
loads. Then the protein level of any load among the 1,000 one-bushel loads must lie
in the interval [10%;14%]. Such constraint does not apply when processing wheat with
various dockage rate (Hennessy and Wahl 1997). For example, 1,000 bushels of grain
with 1% dockage for unacceptable materials can be decomposed into 990 bushels of zero
5percent dockage grain and 10 bushels of cleanings, or 500 bushels of 1.1% dockage and
500 bushels of 0.9% dockage. Therefore, regarding processing wheat at protein dimen-
sion, like Hennessy and Wahl (1997), perfect commingling is an available action to the
wheat farmer; unlike Hennessy and Wahl (1997), however, perfect segregating is not an
available action to the wheat farmer. For one load of wheat, the extent of segregation
depends on this load’s distribution of protein concentration. This future non-linear sep-
arability makes the analysis of this article different from the analysis in Hennessy and
Wahl (1997), in which both perfect segregating and perfect commingling are available as
choices to maximize revenue.
2.1 Model Setup
Unlike Hennessy and Wahl (1997) that studied optimal segregating or commingling de-
cision at elevator level, we consider the optimal decision at farm level. This is because
the near infrared (NIR) technology can be readily applied in ﬁeld and farmers have the
incentive to adopt the technology. If wheat farmers and elevators are facing the same pro-
tein premium schedule, then once farmers adopt the technology to explore the arbitrage
opportunity, there will be very little beneﬁt for elevators to process wheat according to
protein concentration levels. We assume that before the NIR technology is adopted, the
wheat farmer sell her wheat in one load. That is, without the NIR technology, the farmer
cannot segregate high protein wheat from his harvest to obtain the protein premium. After
adopting the NIR technology, then she has the freedom to sorting her wheat according to
protein concentration, and then optimize her revenue either by segregating or commin-
gling. The method developed in this article can be readily applied to analyzing optimal
arrangements of multiple wheat loads.
To better present the results in this paper, a series of deﬁnitions about the wheat
6farmer’s activities (i.e., sorting, segregating, commingling, and processing) dealing the
load of wheat are necessary.
Deﬁnition 1. To sort one load of wheat is to read the protein concentration of each small-
est unit (e.g., one grain or one bushel of grains) of the load, and then label units with same
protein concentrations as a group but label units with different protein concentrations as
different groups.
Here the verb “label” is used only for conceptual convenient. As we will see in this
article that during the optimal processing, the action of “label” is not necessary because a




Deﬁnition 3. Segregating one load of wheat is to separate the load into two or more sub-
loads with different protein concentrations. Complete segregating one load means that
wheat in this load is separate into as many as possible sub-loads such that each sub-load
only contains wheat with the same protein concentration and that protein concentration
of each sub-load differs.
Deﬁnition 4. Processing one load of wheat means to sort the load of wheat and then do
commingling or segregating.
From Deﬁnitions 1 to 4 one can see that sorting is necessary for both commingling
and segregating. Without sorting the farmer cannot know the protein concentrations of
any part in the load, and hence she cannot conduct segregating or commingling. There-
fore, in the rest of this article if we say that “no sorting is needed to a load of wheat,”
7then it implies that neither segregating nor commingling is needed, which also means no
processing is needed to this load of wheat.
Suppose a wheat farmer has one load of wheat with mean protein level m. The mass
of this load of wheat is normalized to one. The protein concentration distribution of this
load of wheat is F(l) with density function f(l) and support [0; ¯ L]. Here ¯ L  1 is the
upper bound of protein concentration of one unit of wheat. We assume there is no atoms
on the protein concentration distribution. For simplicity we assume the farmer knows
the protein distribution before she adopts the NIR technology. If the farmer does not
know the protein distribution until she utilizes the NIR technology, then the estimation
of willingness to pay for the NIR technology would require the farmer’s belief about
protein distributions of her harvest. In the situation that farmers only have a belief about
the protein concentration distribution, our analysis in optimal processing decisions is still
essential. This is because for any given protein concentration distribution under a belief
our analysis can be used to obtain the optimal processing decisions.
In our model the wheat farmer is assumed as a price taker. This is reasonable consider-
ing the large number of wheat farmers in the United States. Let the non-decreasing wheat
price function facing the farmer be p(l), where l is protein concentration of one unit of
wheat. Protein premium is imbedded in the price schedule because high protein wheat
receives high price. In the following subsections we study the wheat farmer’s optimal
segregating and commingling decisions under four price schedules: 1) uniformly curved
schedules (i.e., concave or convex), 2) non-uniformly curved schedules (i.e., concave at
low protein levels and convex at high protein levels, or the reverse), and 3) three-step
schedules.
82.2 Uniformly Curved Schedules
Incentives to segregate and commingle grain with different dockage when the price qual-
ity schedule is uniformly curved (i.e., concave or convex) have been studied in Hennessy
and Wahl (1997). Regarding wheat with different protein concentrations, incentives to
segregate and commingle is similar as what is in Hennessy and Wahl (1997). But we still
demonstrate the results here because some of them will be utilized repeatedly in obtaining
optimal processing decisions when price schedules are not uniformly curved.
Proposition 1. If the price schedule is concave, then no sorting is needed to the load.
That is, this load of wheat will be sold as it is. If the price schedule is convex, then the
load should be sorted and completely segregated.
Proof. Suppose that the price schedule, p(l), is concave and that the processing out-
come is segregating the load into n  2 sub-loads, namely sub-loads 1;:::;n. If we
show that this processing outcome is not optimal under the concave price schedule, then
we prove the ﬁrst half of the proposition. Let sub-load 1 have weight W1 and protein
concentration l1 per unit weight, and let sub-load 2 have weight W2 and protein con-
centration l2 per unit weight. The total revenue from sub-load 1 and from sub-load 2
is W1p(l1)+W2p(l2). If the farmer commingles sub-load 1 and sub-load 2, then the
protein concentration of the mix is (W1l1 +W2l2)=(W1 +W2). Therefore, the revenue
from the mix is (W1+W2)p((W1l1+W2l2)=(W1+W2)). By Jensen’s inequality, we have
(W1+W2)p((W1l1+W2l2)=(W1+W2)) >W1p(l1)+W2p(l2) when p(l) is concave. The
second part of the proposition can be proved by a complete reversal of the above proce-
dure.
From Proposition 1 we have the following corollary.
9Corollary 1. Commingling any two loads increases (decreases) a wheat farmer’s revenue
when the price schedule is concave (convex). Segregating one load increases (decreases)
a wheat farmer’s revenue when the price schedule is convex (concave).
Next proposition studies the effects of protein concentration distribution on revenue
when price schedule is concave and convex.
Proposition 2. Suppose wheat load A and wheat load B have protein concentration dis-
tribution F(l) and G(l), respectively, where G(l) is a mean-preserving spread of F(l).
And suppose loads A and B have the same weight. If price schedule is convex, then a
wheat farmer can receive higher maximum revenue from selling load B than load A. If
price schedule is concave, then the maximum revenue from selling loads A and B is the
same.
Proof. If the price schedule is convex, then by Proposition 1 both load A and load B will





0 p(l)dG(l), respectively. By Proposition 6.D.2 on page 199 of





the price schedule is concave, then by Proposition 1 neither load A nor load B is sorted.
Because loads A and B have the same weight and mean protein concentration, they bring
the same amount revenue to the farmer.
2.3 Nonuniformly Curved Schedules
Instead of being uniform curves, price schedules may have nonuniform curves. Figures 1a
and 1b present two possibilities of these schedules. Figure 1a shows a price schedule that
is concave at low protein concentration levels and convex at high protein concentration
levels. Figure 1b shows a price schedule that is convex at low protein concentration levels
10and concave at high protein concentration levels. Following Hennessy and Wahl (1997)
we call schedules with the curvature of Figure 1a as shape type I and schedules with
the curvature of Figure 1b as shape type II. Without loss of generality it is assumed that
p(0) = 0, so the schedules pass through the origin. In Figure 1a and Figure 1b, points
O and O0 are two ends of price schedule curve. Point B is the inﬂexion point where the
schedule changes from being concave (convex) to being convex (concave) in Figure 1a
(Figure 1b).
In Figure 1a, there are two tangent lines of price curve OO0 that are of critical interest.
Line O0A is the tangent of the price curve with tangency point at A. If there is no tan-
gency point, then set point A as origin O. Line CD is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 5. Let the
coordinates of points A, B, C, and D are [lA;p(lA)], [lB;p(lB)], [lC;p(lC)], and [lD;p(lD)],
respectively.
Deﬁnition 5. Line CD in Figure 1a is deﬁned as: (1) Line CD is a tangent of curve
OB with tangency point at C. (2) Line CD intersects curve O0B at point D. (3) The




0 f(l)dl = lC.
Deﬁnition 5 indicates that the commingle of wheat with protein concentration no
higher than lD has mean protein concentration lC. Let m be the mean protein concen-
tration of the initial load of wheat. Therefore, if m  lA, line CD does not exist.
In Figure 1b, there are two critical tangent lines as well. Line OA is the tangent of the
price curve with tangency point at A. If there is no tangency point, then set point A as O0.
Line CD is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 6.
Deﬁnition 6. Line CD in Figure 1b is deﬁned as: (1) Line CD is a tangent of curve
O0B with tangency point at C. (2) Line CD intersects curve OB at point D. (3) The





11Deﬁnition 6 indicates that the commingle of wheat with protein concentration no less
than lD has mean protein concentration lC. Therefore, if m  lA, lineCD does not exist.
For schedules with shape type I and schedules with shape type II, the optimal process-
ing arrangements are presented in next proposition.
Proposition 3. For shape type I schedules, (i) when m  lA, then no sorting is needed in
the optimal arrangements; and (ii) when m > lA, then in the optimal arrangements wheat
in this load with protein concentration higher than lD should be completely segregated
and the remaining wheat should be completely commingled. Here lD is the l-coordinate
of point D deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.
For shape type II schedules, (i) when m  lA, then no sorting is needed in the optimal
arrangements; and (ii) when m < lA, then in the optimal arrangements wheat in this load
with protein level higher than lD should be completely commingled and the remaining
wheat should be completely segregated. Here lD is the l-coordinate of point D deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 6.
We ﬁrst prove a lemma that will be used repeatedly in the proof of the proposition.
Suppose one unit of wheat with protein concentration a is a commingle of wheat with
purely a1 protein concentration and wheat with purely a2 protein concentration. And
suppose this unit of wheat is segregated into two sub-loads, namely A and B, with mean
protein concentration lA and lB, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that
a1 < a2 and lA < lB. Then the following two items are true:
Lemma 1. (i) a1  lA < lB  a2. (ii) lA (or lB) can be any value on the interval of [a1;a)
(or (a;a2]).
Proof. The proof of item (i) is trivial because the unit of wheat dose not contain any
wheat that with protein concentration less than a1 or higher than a2.
12Now let us prove item (ii) is true. Let lA equal lA and lB equal lB, where lA (or lB) is
an arbitrary value on the interval of [a1;a) (or [a;a2)). To show item (ii) is to show that
the unit of wheat can be segregated into sub-loads A and B such that lA = lA and lB = lB.







Suppose the weights of a1 wheat and a2 wheat areW1 andW2, respectively. ThenW1







Suppose we commingle x units of a1 wheat and y units of a2 wheat to obtain sub-load
















If we show that the remaining wheat (i.e., wheat not in sub-load A) has weight WB
and mean protein concentration lB, then the proof is completed. Clearly, the weight of
remaining wheat is (W1 x)+(W2 y) = (W1+W2) (x+y) = 1 WA =WB. And the
13protein of the remaining wheat is (W1  x)a1 +(W2  y)a2 = (W1a1 +W2a2) (xa1 +
ya2) = a  WAlA =WBlB. Therefore, the mean protein concentration is lB.
If we use vector (lA;lB) to denote the protein concentrations of sub-loads A and B
segregated from this one unit of wheat and if we relax the constraint lA < lB, then Lemma
1 can be rewritten as
Lemma 2. Suppose one unit of wheat with protein concentration a is a commingle of
wheat with purely a1 protein concentration and wheat with purely a2 protein concentra-
tion. If this unit of wheat is segregated into two sub-loads, then it can and only can be
segregated into two sub-loads such that (lA;lB) is majorized by (a1;a2), where lA and lB
are the protein concentrations of these two sub-loads, respectively.
Based on Lemma 1 we can prove Proposition 3. The proof is presented in Appendix
A.
2.4 Three-Step Schedules
In wheat markets the price schedules are often of the step function forms. In this sub-
section we study a wheat farmer’s optimal processing decisions when price schedules are
three-step function forms. When price schedule in wheat market is an N-step schedule
(N >3), unfortunately we cannot obtain an elegant uniformly concave or convex effective
price schedule by eliminating dominated discontinuous points on the step price schedule
like Hennessy and Wahl (1997) did. This is because of the non-linear separability in the
protein dimension. However, we still can use price schedule convexity and the results
of optimal decisions facing three-step schedules to simplify the effective price schedule
once we know the protein distribution of one load.
14Suppose the three-step price schedule is
p(l) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
p1 if 0  l < l1
p2 if l1  l < l2
p3 if l2  l  ¯ L,
(5)
where l 2[0; ¯ L] is protein concentration of one load of wheat; p3 > p2 > p1 >0 are prices;
and l1 and l2 are constants such that 0  l1 < l2  ¯ L. Figure 2 depicts this three-step price
schedule. In this subsection we further assume that the mean protein concentration of one
load of wheat, m, is such that m 2 (0;l2). If m  l2, then it will receive the highest price
and hence its owner has no incentive to further process it.
The farmer’s problem is to maximize her revenue by optimally processing her wheat.
Because the price schedule has a three-step function form, the farmer’s problem is equal
to optimally segregating his wheat into three sub-loads, namely S1, S2, and S3, to get
the maximized revenue. Let mi, pi, and qi be the mean protein concentration, the price
received, and the weight of sub-load Si, i = 1;:::;3, respectively. By construction we
have m1 2 [0;l1), m2 2 [l1;l2), m3 2 [l2; ¯ L], and å
3
i=1qimi = m (please recall that the total




For the next result, several deﬁnitions are necessary.












Deﬁnition 7 says that the average protein level of the mix of all wheat with protein
level higher than c1 is greater than or equal to l1; and the average protein level of the mix
of all wheat with protein level higher than c2 is l2. Clearly we have c2 < l2 and c1 < l1.








Deﬁnition 8 says that ˆ l1 is the minimum non-negative constant such that the average
protein level of wheat distributed on [ˆ l1;c2] is no less than l1.
































F(c1)  q1  F(ˆ l1):
For the optimal processing outcomes under three-step price schedules, we have the
16following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the mean protein concentration of one load of wheat, m, is such
that m 2 (0;l2). The optimal processing outcomes are (i) the solutions of problem (6)
if c2  l1; (ii) the solutions of problem (7) if c2 > l1 and if ˆ l1 > 0; and (iii) q
1 = 0,
q
2 = F(c2), and q
3 = 1 F(c2) if c2 > l1 and if ˆ l1 = 0.
VisualpresentationsofthethreeitemsinProposition4aredepictedinFigure3, Figure
4, and Figure 5, respectively. To prove the proposition, several lemmas are necessary.
Lemma 3. The maximized amount of wheat with mean protein concentration at l2 (l1)that
can be segregated out from the initial load is 1 F(c2) (1 F(c1)).
Proof. The proof is trivial. Suppose now all wheat with protein concentration that is no
less than c2 is segregated into sub-load S3. By the deﬁnition of c2 we know that the mean
protein concentration of sub-load S3 is l2. In order to increase the weight of sub-load S3,
one must add some of the remaining wheat into sub-load S3. However, the wheat in the
remaining now has protein concentration lower than c2, which is lower than l2. Adding
such wheat into sub-load S3 will make the mean protein concentration in the sub-load
lower than l2. The same argument applies when proving the other part of this lemma.
Lemma 4. In the optimal arrangements, (i) if q
1 > 0, then m2 = l1 and m3 = l2; (ii) if
q
2 > 0 or if q
3 > 0, then m3 = l2.
Proof. The proof is completed by simple arbitrage arguments. For item (i), if q
1 > 0 but
m2 > l1, then the farmer can always increase her revenue by commingling some wheat
from sub-load S1 to sub-load S2 as long as m2  l1. This is because the wheat that is
moved from sub-load S1 to sub-load S2 now is sold at price p2 instead of price p1 and
the price of wheat initially in sub-load S2 is not affected. The same argument applies for
17m3 = l2 of item (i) and for the ﬁrst part of item (ii). If q
3 > 0, then q
2 > 0 or q
1 > 0,
or both. This is because m < l2. By item (i) and the ﬁrst part of item (ii) we know that
m3 = l2.
Let ¯ lS1 denote the protein concentration of wheat that has the highest protein in S1.
Let lS2 (or lS3) denote the protein concentration of wheat that has the lowest protein in
sub-load S2 (or S3). The next lemma can be stated as
Lemma 5. In the optimal arrangements, we have (i) ¯ lS1  min[lS2;lS3] and (ii) any wheat
with protein concentration no higher than ¯ lS1 is in sub-load S1.
Proof. Suppose in the optimal arrangement we have lS1 > min[lS2;lS3]. That is, pro-
tein concentration of some wheat in sub-load S1 is higher than protein concentration of
some wheat in sub-load S2 or in sub-load S3. Without loss of generality we assume that
min[lS2;lS3]=lS2. Then the farmer can increase her revenue by doing step (1) exchanging
1 unit of ¯ lS1 wheat from sub-load S1 with 1 unit wheat with protein concentration lower
than ¯ lS1 from sub-load S2; and step (2) moving d amount of wheat with protein concen-
tration lower than l1 from sub-load S1 to sub-load S2 as long as m2 is no less than l1. By
doing step (1), m2 is increased and but the revenue is not affected; by doing step (2), q2
is increased by d and q1 is decreased by d. So is the revenue is increased by d(p2  p1).
In sum, we must have lS1  min[lS2;lS3] in the optimal arrangement. Item (ii) follows
naturally.
Lemma 6. In the optimal arrangements, (i) if c2  l1, then ¯ lS1 2 [c1;c2]; (ii) if c2 > l1,
then ¯ lS1 2 [c1; ˆ l1].
Proof. First, we show that ¯ lS1  c1. If lS1 < c1, then the mean protein concentration of
the commingle of wheat in sub-load S1 and wheat in S3 will be lower than l1, which
contradicts that m2 2 [l1;l2) and m3  l2.
18Second, we show that if c2  l1 then ¯ lS1  c2. Suppose when c2  l1 we have ¯ lS1 > c2.
So the mean protein concentration of the commingle of wheat in sub-load S2 and wheat in
S3 will be higher than l2, which contradicts that in the optimal arrangements m2 2 [l1;l2)
and m3 = l2 (Lemma 4).
Third, we show that if c2 > l1 then ¯ lS1  ˆ l1. Please note that ˆ l1 has deﬁnition only if
c2 > l1. Suppose ¯ lS1 > ˆ l1 when c2 > l1. Therefore we have q
1 = F(¯ lS1) > 0. Taking q
1 as
ﬁxed, to maximize the revenue is equal to maximize q3 under the constraint of m2  l1.
The maximized q3 is 1 F(c2). Since c2 > l1 and lS1 > ˆ l1, we must have m2 > l1, which
is not optimal (Lemma 4).
Lemma 7. In the optimal arrangements, (i) if c2  l1, then m2 = l1; (ii) if c2 > l1 and if
ˆ l1 > 0, then m2 = l1.
Proof. If q
1 > 0, then items (i) and (ii) are true according to Lemma 4. Now we prove
that items (i) and (ii) are true when q
1 = 0.
If q
1 = 0, then we must have q
2 > 0 and q
3  0. This implies that m  l1. If c2  l1,
then the initial load of wheat can be seen as a commingle of wheat with l2 protein concen-




0 f(l)dl < l1.
According to Lemma 1, the initial load of wheat can be segregated into two sub-loads
with one sub-load having protein concentration at l1 and the other sub-load having pro-
tein concentration at l2. Given q
1 = 0, this segregation is optimal. It is because that if
q
1 = 0, then the optimal segregation should be to maximize q3 while keeping m2  l1.
Some algebra can show that q3 is not maximized when m2 > l1.
If q
1 = 0, then q
2 and q











19Solving (8) we obtain q
3 =
m m2








Therefore, in the optimal arrangement m2 must be equal to l1 if c2  l1. The same proce-
dure follows when proving item (ii).
The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix B. One may intend to think
that the programming problems (6) and (7) without the fourth constraint will generate
the same optimal solutions. Her argument could be the programming problem naturally
prefers a smaller q1 over a bigger q1; therefore, the programming problem without the
constraint F(c1)  q1  F(ˆ l1) will automatically drive q1s small enough so that F(c1) 
q1  F(ˆ l1) is met.
But this is not necessarily true. Decreasing one unit of q1 from q
1 means that the
farmer will gain p2  p1. But to keep m2 = l1, the farmer has to move x amount of wheat
from sub-load S3 (with averagely l2 protein level) to sub-load S2; otherwise wheat in
sub-load S2 will have average protein level lower than l1. Therefore, the revenue loss is
x(p3  p2). If x(p3  p2) > p2  p1, then decreasing q
1 is not proﬁtable.
Suppose we delete the constraint F(c1)  q1  F(ˆ l1) in problem (7). And suppose






f(l)dl > l1. In this case the achiev-
able q2 and q3 given q1 should be q2 =
R c2
¯ lS1
f(l)dl and 1 F(c2), respectively. However,
since we delete the constraint F(c1)  q1  ˆ l1, the programming problem will obtain q2
and q3 based on q1 by its two equality constrains. And always the q2 (or q3) obtained
from the two equality constraints is smaller (or greater) than the true value. Therefore,
the programming problem without constraint F(c1)  q1  F(ˆ l1) biases the revenue to a
bigger value.
20Sivaraman et al. (2002) claim that their method applies to step premium schedules
(page 157, Case 4). However, their claim is not correct. They assume that in the optimal
outcomes the protein levels in one bin are continuous, (i.e., Di = [di 1;di] in the last
paragraph on page 156). But this may not be true. Here is an example. Suppose the
protein concentrations of one load of wheat is uniformly distributed on [11:4%;13:6%].
Then the average protein level of this load is 12.5%. The price schedule is wheat with
protein level higher than or equal to 13% receives 13% protein price; wheat with protein
level lower than 12% receives 11% protein price; the rest of wheat receives 12% price.
Suppose wheat prices encourage commingling and the optimal solution is that q
1 = 0,
q
2 > 0, and q
3 > 0, here q
1, q
2, and q
3 are quantities of wheat that receive 11%, 12%, and
13% protein price, respectively. Then q
2 = 1=2 and q











Based on the uniform distribution, how to achieve q
2 = 1=2 and q
3 = 1=2? Is it pos-
sible to ﬁnd d 2 [11:4%;13:6%] such that (d  11:4%)=(13:6% 11:4%) = 1=2 and
(d +11:4%)=2 = 12%? The answer is no. One procedure that can make q
2 = 1=2 and
q
3 = 1=2 is as follows: Step 1. Put wheat with protein level between 12.4% and 13.6%
into one bin, say bin A, and mix them completely; so the average protein level in bin A
is 13%; Step 2. Put wheat with protein level between 11.4% and 12.4% into another bin,
say bin B; so the average protein level in bin B is 11.9%. Step 3. Move some wheat (with
average protein level 13%) from bin A to bin B until the average protein level in bin B
reaches 12%. Clearly protein levels of wheat in bin B is not continuous. For example,
Bin B could includes wheat with protein levels between 11.4% and 12.4% and wheat with
protein levels at 13%.
21Since in reality wheat protein premium often has step-form schedules, the result in
Proposition 4 will be utilized as the basis in the empirical part of this article. In next
section we estimate the wheat protein stock demand system that will be utilized when
simulating the WTP of the sorting technology.
3 Wheat Protein Stock Demand System
Since price differences, not price levels, matter for calculating the WTP, in our econo-
metric model we focus on price differences instead of price levels. That is, the dependent
variables in the econometric model are price differences. We expect that the protein pre-
miums are mainly affected by the wheat stocks and seasonality based on the standard
supply-demand analysis. Speciﬁcally, the econometric models are
p3t   p2t = aX +e1t (11)
p2t   p1t = bX +e2t; (12)
where pit (i=1,2,3)iswheatprice, pi, inperiodt; andX =(1;sh2t;sh3t;tst;sea1t;sea2t;sea3t)
is the independent variable vector in which sh2t and sh3t are the shares of wheat stocks
that receive p2t and p3t, respectively; tst is the total stocks in period t; seajt, j = 1;2;3 is
seasonal dummy of season j in period t; e1t and e2t are error terms.
Regressions in equation (11) can alleviate the endogeneity problem existing in the
model. The reason is that there are omitting variables that affect wheat prices and are
correlated with wheat stocks, such as weather, foreign exchange rate, and prices of live
cattle or hogs. By differencing prices, these variables will likely be canceled out so that
regressions in equation (11) can ﬁt the classical linear model assumptions for ordinary
least square (OLS) estimator to be best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). We use the
22feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method to correct autocorrelation problem in
the model.
3.1 Data
We use daily cash price data of HRW wheat and HRS wheat from Montana Wheat and
Barley Committee (http://wbc.agr.mt.gov/). For HRW wheat, the prices are broken down
to prices for 11% protein wheat, 12% protein wheat, and 13% protein wheat, respectively.
For HRS wheat, the prices are broken down to prices for 13% protein wheat, 14% protein
wheat, and 15% protein wheat, respectively. The time range for the price data is from
1980 to 2009. To make time series continuous, we use monthly averages of daily cash
price data. For some years price data are missing for one or two months. We use cubic
spline interpolation to ﬁll the missing monthly average data. Therefore we get 360 obser-
vations, in which 8 observations are data ﬁlled by cubic spline interpolation. Figures 6
and 7 provide visual presentations of monthly HRW wheat prices and HRS wheat prices,
respectively.
The monthly stocks of HRW wheat with 11%, 12%, and 13% protein level are calcu-
lated using the following procedure. Step 1), all wheat quarterly stocks (1980-2009) are
obtained from NASS of USDA;2 Step 2), calculate the percentage of HRW wheat produc-
tion in all wheat production using data of wheat production by class from Crop Quality
Reports published by U.S. Wheat Associates; Step 3), quarterly all wheat stocks in step
1) are multiplied by the percentage in step 2) to get the quarterly HRW wheat stock; Step
4), the percentages of HRW wheat with different protein levels in every year from 1980
to 2009 are obtained from annual Crop Quality Report published by U.S. Wheat Asso-
2Thewebsiteaddressis: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1079
(accessed on October 28, 2010)
23ciates. Step 5), using data from Step 4), calculate the percentages of the following three
categories of HRW wheat in total HRW wheat production: HRW wheat with protein level
less than 12%, HRW wheat with protein level higher than or equal to 12% but less than
13%, HRW wheat with protein level higher than or equal to 13%; Step 6), quarterly HRW
wheat stocks in step 3) were multiplied by percentages in step 5) to get the quarterly
stocks of HRW wheat at 11%, 12%, and 13% protein level, respectively; Step 7), using
cubic spline interpolation to quarterly stocks obtained in step 6) to get monthly HRW
wheat stocks. The monthly stocks of HRW wheat at the three protein levels are presented
in Figure 8. By the similar steps we can obtain the monthly stocks of HRS wheat at
protein levels of 13%, 14%, and 15%, respectively. The result is presented in Figure 9.
3.2 Regression Results
The results of regression in equation (11) for HRW wheat and HRS wheat are reported in
Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. From Table 1 we can see that the coefﬁcients of sh2t
are signiﬁcant at 5% level in regression (12). The coefﬁcients of sh3t are signiﬁcant at 5%
level in regressions (11) and (12). For example, in the case of HRW wheat, if the share of
13% protein wheat is increased by one percentage point, then the price difference between
13% protein wheat and 12% protein wheat will decrease by 0.42 cent. The coefﬁcient of
tst are not signiﬁcantly different from zero, which means total stocks do not affect wheat
protein premium. Seasonal dummies do not affect price difference between 13% protein
wheat and 12% protein wheat, but they do affect price difference between 12% protein
wheat and 11% protein wheat and price difference between 13% protein wheat and 11%
protein wheat.
From Table 2 we can see that the coefﬁcients of sh3t are signiﬁcant at 5% level in
each regression. If the share of 15% protein wheat is increased by one percentage point,
24then the price difference between p3 and p2 will decrease by 0.53 cent. The coefﬁcient of
sh2 is signiﬁcantly different from 0 in regression (12) at 10% level but is not signiﬁcant
in regression (11). The coefﬁcient of tst is not signiﬁcantly different from zero in each
regression, which means total stocks do not affect wheat protein premium. The price
differences in the third season (July, August, and September), the harvest season of HRS
wheat, are not signiﬁcantly different from price differences in the fourth season (October,
November, and December). But the price differences in the second season (April, May,
and June) are signiﬁcantly lower than the prices differences in the fourth season. This
indicates that the protein premium reaches the highest value during the harvest season
and decreases as wheat stocks shrink.
3.3 Field-Level Protein Concentration Distribution Model and Data
In order to estimate how much wheat with different protein levels can be sorted out from
a load of wheat produced by a farmer, we need to know the protein concentration dis-
tribution of this load of wheat. Denote F() as the distribution function of the protein
concentration. Our task in this subsection is to estimate F(). Washington State Univer-
sity Extension Cereal Variety Testing Program (http://variety.wsu.edu/) provides wheat
and barley variety testing data and cultural data that can be traced back to 1997. One va-
riety is usually planted in several different locations. The data report the variety’s yield,
test weight and protein concentration in each location and each year. In this subsection
we focus on HRW wheat. The method we develop here can be easily applied to HRS
wheat variety testing results.
From 1997 to 2009, the Program tested 194 HRW varieties in 15 locations across the
State of Washington. Even though there were so many varieties tested, only a few of
them were widely planted by wheat farmers. According to data from National Agricul-
25tural Statistics Service (NASS) of USDA, in each crop year, the top ten varieties usually
accounted for more than 90 percent of planted area for the same class of wheat in the
State of Washington.3 Therefore, in our analysis we only focused on the top 10 varieties
in a crop year. According to this standard, 16 HRW wheat varieties were chosen from
1997 to 2009. The names of varieties and locations are listed in Table 3.
Top varieties varied from year to year. One variety may be popular in some years but
disappearedfromthelistoftopvarietiesinanotheryear. Inaddition, noteveryvarietywas
tested in every location every year. In one year, some locations may have more varieties
than other locations. It was also possible that one of our 16 varieties in some years did
not get tested at all. We collect the observation of one variety’s performance into our
dataset if: a) it is in the list of top varieties; and b) it was tested at least one time between
1997 and 2009. Using this screen we collected 538 observations. For each observation,
we know the variety’s name, yield, test weight, protein level, trial location where it was
tested, and year when it was tested. We also know detailed cultural information about the
trial, such as the type of soil, fertilizer usage, precipitation, latitude and longitude, etc.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the 538 observations of HRW wheat protein
concentrations. Its sample average is 11.87%. Its maximum and minimum values are
16.6% and 7.4%, respectively. The sample standard deviation is 0.017. However, this
is not a satisfying estimator of the variability of HRW wheat protein concentration. The
reason is that it is at the farm level for a given variety and in a given year that protein seg-
regation occurs. But these 538 observations include 16 varieties planted on 15 locations
within 13 years. If we accept this standard deviation as the estimator of protein variabil-
ity, then we will over-estimate protein variability. To get a better estimation, we need to
control for the effect of varieties, locations and years.
3Datasource: http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics by State/Washington/Historic Data/smallgrains/whtvar.pdf
26We applied regression analysis to estimate the protein variability. We assume that
protein concentration has normal distribution conditional on variety, location, and year.
That is,













where x is a shorthand for the vector of a constant and dummy control variables:
(constant;year2;:::year13;variety2;:::;variety16;location1;:::;location15). Here i, j,
and k start from 2 because we set year1, variety1, and location1 as bases. Since in the
dataset there is only one observation of protein concentration for a variety at one location
in one year, it is difﬁcult to test the normality of protein concentration conditional on
variety, location, and year. However, we can test the normality of protein concentration
conditional on variety or location, or both. If we cannot reject the normality in these tests,
then we will have good reason to assume that protein concentration conditional on variety,
location, and year has a normal distribution as well.4
The linear regression model can be written as













where u  Normal(0;s2) is the error term. An unbiased estimator of s2 is s2 = e0e=(n 
K  1) where e is least squares residuals, n is the number of observations, and K is the
number of independent variables.
The results of regression (14) are listed in Table 5. The value of s2 is 0.0001. Combin-
ing the coefﬁcients in Table 5, we will know exactly the distribution of protein concen-
4Results of Lilliefors’ test (Lilliefors, 1967) on the normality of protein concentration show that in most
cases we cannot reject the hypothesis that our sample of protein concentration (conditional on one or two
variables of year, variety, and location) comes from a normal distribution at the 0.01 signiﬁcance level.
27tration for a given variety at one location in one year. For example, the estimated protein
distribution of variety Boundary at Connell in 2009 is Normal(0:126;0:0001). We are
conﬁdent that the distribution Normal(0:126;0:0001) is a satisfactory approximation of
protein distribution of variety Boundary at Connell, Washington in 2009 at farm level.
The reason is that the trials of one location are very closed to each other. For example, in
Connell Washington from year 2005 to 2009, the shortest distance between two trials is
only 200 feet; and the longest distance is 1.4 miles. Therefore, we can see these trails as
a reasonable sample from an individual farm.
Regarding HRS wheat, the data set includes variety testing results of 13 years, 15
varieties, and 28 locations in the State of Washington. The regression for HRS wheat is













whose results are presented in Table 6.
Now we have protein distribution conditional on variety, location, and year. Together
with the protein-price relations, we can calculate the revenue difference for a farmer be-
tween segregating and not segregating. We now have all the elements we need to estimate
the WTP of wheat farmers for the sorting technology. In the next section we show how to
utilize these elements in the simulation, and we report the simulation results.
4 WTP Simulation
In this section we focus on the WTP of HRW wheat farmers. Simulations for WTP of
HRS wheat farmers follow the same methods. We take sets of continuous stock data from
the data set as wheat stocks facing farmers. For example, we may take wheat stocks from
crop year 1980/1981 to crop year 1989/1990 from the data set as wheat stocks facing
28farmers. Then the WTP based on wheat stocks from 1980/1981 to 1989/1990 is the WTP
for the technology if it had been launched in that period of time. Depending on which
period of time we take, there are multiple possibilities of wheat stocks facing farmers.
The general idea under the simulation procedure is as follows. Given initial HRW
wheat stocks, we ﬁnd out what the wheat stocks will be after the sorting technology is
adopted by farmers who can beneﬁt from the technology considering the technology’s
market equilibrium effect. When we ﬁnd out the wheat stocks after sorting, then we
calculate the new price differences. Based on the new price differences, we then calculate
the WTP of wheat farmers for the sorting technology. We calculate the WTP on 100-acre
and 10-year basis. We name it as normalized WTP. Here “10-year” is the lifespan of a
sorter and “100-acre” is the area of ﬁeld whose production is sorted by the sorter. In other
words, the normalized WTP stands for the net present value of a farmer’s willingness to
pay for sorting wheat from 100 acres every year and for 10 years. The interest rate is set
at r=0.05. Once we have the normalized WTP, it is easy to calculate a farmer’s WTP for
a sorter if the sorter can last M years and can sort production from N acres per year. We
use the trend yield in this report.5. The yield trend is described as
(16) yieldt = const +b(t  1932)+et;
wheret =1933;1934;:::;2009. Thestatisticsforregression(16)aresummarizedinTable
7.
We take sets of 10-year continuous stock data directly from the data set and use them
as the wheat stock facing wheat farmers. For example, we may use historical wheat stock
data from crop year 1999-2000 to crop year 2008-2009. There are 30 calendar years
(1980-2009) and 29 complete crop years (1980-81, , 2008-09) in the data set. Hence
5Data source: NASS, all wheat yield, 1933-2009, website: http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/
29we have 20 different sets of wheat stocks to take. They are: wheat stocks of crop years
1980-81 to 1989-90, wheat stocks of crop years 1981-82 to 1990-91, :::, wheat stocks of
crop years 1999-00 to 2008-09. We go through simulation for each of the 20 wheat stock
sets. For HRW wheat, the mean WTP from the 20 stock sets is $2,028 (about 5.6 cents
per bushel). For HRS wheat, the mean WTP from the 20 stock sets is $1,910 (about 4.8
cents per bushel). Figure 10 depicts the WTP of HRW wheat farmers. Figure 11 depicts
the WTP of HRS wheat farmers. In Figures 10 and 11, a crop year on the x-axis means
that the ten-year continuous stock data starts in that year.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Two important and related trends in food markets are a) growth in demand for differenti-
ated products, and b) capacity to distinguish between quality attributes at the commercial
level. U.S. planted wheat acres are declining in the face of stiff international competition
in premium product markets and demand for crop acres from biofuels. A sorting technol-
ogy could allow wheat growers to better identify grain that can be directed to premium
markets while also increasing consumer surplus. Our work provides a coherent methodol-
ogy for evaluating the beneﬁts for a farm-level information technology. A microeconomic
optimization model of wheat farmers’ segregating and commingling decisions is devel-
oped. Wheat farmers’ WTP for the sorting technology is simulated using U.S. HRW and
HRS wheat prices and stocks based on an estimation of a wheat protein stock demand
system. Our preliminary ﬁndings from the simulation show that a typical HRW (HRS)
wheat farmer’s WTP for the sorting technology is about 5.6 (4.8) cents per bushel. Future
work such as studying the sorting technology’s impacts on wheat protein premiums or




In this appendix we prove Proposition 3.
Proof. Here we only prove the results for shape type I schedules. The same procedure
applies when proving results related with shape type II schedules.
Part A. In this part we prove that under shape type I schedules item (i) is true. Sup-
pose in the optimal arrangement the load is segregated into n  2 sub-loads with different
protein concentrations. Then there must be at least one sub-load, say sub-load i, with pro-
tein concentration less than lA. If not, then m would be greater than lA, which contradicts
m  lA in item (i). Next we are going to show that the wheat farmer can increase her
revenue by commingling sub-load i with any other sub-load j 6= i.
Let li and lj be the protein concentration of sub-loads i and j, respectively. If lj 
lA, then sub-load i and sub-load j are under the segment of the price schedule that is
uniformly concave, therefore, according to Corollary 1 the farmer can always increase
her revenue by commingling sub-load i and sub-load j. If lj > lA, then from Figure A1
we see that points [li;p(li)], A, and [lj;p(lj)] form a concave price schedule. It is easy
to show that for any two points E and F on the price curve, if point E (F) is on the left
(right) of point A, then points E, A, and F form a concave price schedule. Similarly, by
Corollary 1 the farmer can always increase her revenue by commingling sub-load i and
sub-load j. In sum, for shape type I schedules, when m  lA, then no sorting is needed in
the optimal arrangements.
31Part B. Now let us show that for shape type I schedules item (ii) is true. In Step 1 we
show that when m > lA, then the tangent line CD deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5 uniquely exists.
Step 2 shows that in the optimal arrangement there is one and only one sub-load that has
protein concentration lower than lB. Let Z be the name of this sub-load. Step 3 shows
that sub-load Z has protein concentration lC. Step 4 shows that in sub-load Z there is no
wheat with protein concentration higher than lD. Step 5 concludes the proof.
Step 1. In this step we show that when m > lA, then line CD deﬁned in Deﬁnition
5 uniquely exists. Let us start from the tangent line AO0. Imagine that line AO0 is ro-
tated in a clockwise direction while the tangent point between the line and the curve OB
moves rightward from point A. Let [lj;p(lj)] denote the coordinates of the tangent point,




0 f(l)dl (i.e., the mean protein concentration of the commingle of wheat
with protein concentration no higher than lk) is decreasing and the value of lj is increas-




0 f(l)dl < lj.
When the coordinate of the tangency point is [lj;p(lj)], then the slope of the tangent
is p0(lj). Hence the equation of the tangent is p = p0(lj)l+[p(lj)  p0(lj)lj]. Then given






p = p0(lj)lk+[p(lj)  p0(lj)lj];
(A-1)
where lk > lj. From equation system (A-1) we can obtain that the relationship between lj
and lk is determined implicitly by
(A-2) H(lk;lj)  p(lk)  p0(lj)lk [p(lj)  p0(lj)lj] = 0:
















Since curve OB is concave, we have p00(lj) < 0. Together with lk > lj we have
p00(lj)(lk  lj) < 0 in equation (A-3). Because at point [lk;p(lk)] the slope of curve O0B
is greater than the slope of the line JK, it is true that p0(lk)  p0(lj) > 0. Therefore, we
show dlk=dlj < 0.
When lj = lB, which means the tangency point is at point B, then we have lk = lB
as well because point B is the inﬂection point. This implies that when lj = lB then the
tangency point and the interception point coincide with point B.








where lk() is a function of lj implicitly determined in equation (A-2). When lj = lA,




0 f(l)dl > lA. When lj = lB, then




0 f(l)dl < lB. Therefore, according to the




0 f(l)dl = lC. This shows that when m > lA, then line CD deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 5 exists.
Now we show that the line deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5 is unique. The uniqueness will be

































The inequality in expression (A-5) holds because f(lk)lkl0
k(lj)(
R lk(lj)







Step 2. In this step we show that in the optimal arrangement there is one and only
one sub-load that has mean protein concentration less than lB. We denote this unique
sub-load as Z. Suppose there are two or more sub-loads that have protein concentration
less than lB. Since curve OB is concave, according to Corollary 1 the farmer can increase
her revenue by commingling these sub-loads. Therefore, having more than one sub-loads
that are with protein concentration less than lB is not optimal. If there is not any sub-load
that has protein concentration lower than lB, then there must be one sub-load, namely
sub-load J, with protein concentration lj  lB that is a commingle of wheat with protein
concentration li < lB and wheat with protein concentration lk > lB. If lj > lB, then since
curve O0B is convex, by Proposition 1 sub-load J should be completely segregated. If
lj = lB, then for any point, say point E, with l-coordinate lE such that lB < lE < lk, we
can always ﬁnd a point, say point F with l-coordinate lF such that li < lF < lB, so that
points E, B, and F form a convex price schedule (Figure A2). By Lemma 1, the sub-
load with protein concentration lj can be segregated into two smaller sub-loads. One is
with protein concentration at lE and the other one with protein concentration lF. Again,
by Proposition 1 sub-load J should be segregated. Therefore, having no sub-load whose
34protein concentration is less than lB is not optimal either.
Step 3. In this step we show that the protein concentration of sub-load Z, lZ, is equal
to lC. Here lC is the l-coordinate of point C deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5. Suppose in the op-
timal arrangement we have lZ > lC. Then there are two types of conﬁguration of this
unique sub-load Z. The ﬁrst one is that there is some wheat with protein concentra-
tion lj > lD in sub-load Z; the second one is that some wheat with protein concentration





0 f(l)dl = lC. Intuitively, since the mean protein concentration of
wheat with protein concentration lower than lD is lC, then to form a sub-load with protein
concentration higher than lC one needs either to include some wheat with protein concen-
tration higher than lD in the sub-load or to exclude some wheat with protein concentration
lower than lZ, or both. The two types of conﬁguration are not mutual exclusive.
Now we show the ﬁrst conﬁguration is not optimal. Suppose sub-load Z has some
wheat with protein concentration lj >lD. Since the the mean protein concentration of this
sub-load is equal to lZ, this sub-load must have some wheat with protein concentration
lower than lZ. Draw a line that connects points Z and D (see Figure A3). Then we can
always ﬁnd a point, say point E, that is very close to point Z from the left side so that
lE > li, here lE is the l-coordinate of point E. Points E, Z, and D form a convex price
schedule. By Lemma 1, sub-load Z can be segregated into two smaller loads, one is
with protein concentration at lD; and the other one is with protein concentration lE. By
Corollary 1, segregating sub-load Z increases the farmer’s revenue. Therefore, the ﬁrst
type of conﬁguration is not optimal.
Nowweshowthesecondoneisnotoptimaleither. Ifsomewheatwithproteinconcen-
tration lower than lZ is not included in sub-load Z, then this wheat must be commingled
with some wheat with protein concentration higher than lB to form a sub-load with mean
35protein concentration no less than lB. If not, then there are at least two sub-loads that
have protein concentration lower than lB, which has been shown not optimal in Step 2.
Suppose it is that wheat with protein concentration equal to li < lZ is commingled with
wheat with protein concentration equal to lj > lB to form a sub-load K with protein con-
centration equal to lk  lB. If lk > lB, then it is always beneﬁcial to segregate sub-load K
because curve O0B is convex. If lk = lB, then (with the same argument we made in Step 2)
we can always ﬁnd a point, say E, which is very close to point B from the left side, so that
points E, B, and [lj;p(lj)] form a convex price schedule (See Figure A4). According to
Corollary 1, however, segregating this sub-load is beneﬁcial. Therefore, the second type
is not optimal either.
Now we show the unique sub-load Z cannot have lZ < lC. If lZ < lC, then there must
be some wheat with protein concentration at lj such that lZ lj lD that is not in sub-load
Z. Otherwise the mean protein concentration of sub-load Z will be lC or higher. However,
the three points, Z, C, and [lj;p(lj)], form a concave price schedule (See Figure A5).
According to Corollary 1 the farmer can increase her revenue by commingling wheat in
sub-load Z with wheat that has protein concentration lj.
Step 4. This step shows that in sub-load Z there is no wheat with protein concentration
higher than lD. Here lD is the l-coordinate of point D deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5. Suppose
this is not true, then sub-load Z contains some wheat with protein concentration lk > lD.
Therefore, there must be some wheat with protein concentration lj such that lC  lj  lD
that is not in sub-load Z. This is because if all wheat with protein concentration between
lC and lD is in sub-load lZ, then together with some wheat with protein concentration
higher than lD being in sub-load lZ as well, the mean protein concentration of sub-load
Z must be higher than lC. Please recall that the mean protein concentration of wheat
with protein concentration less than lD is lC. We name the sub-load that contains wheat
36with protein concentration lj as sub-load J. By the result in Step 2 we know the mean
protein concentration of sub-load J is no less than lB. We clam that sub-load J only
contains wheat with protein concentration at lj. If sub-load J is a commingle of wheat
with different protein concentrations and if its mean protein concentration is higher than
lB, then according to Corollary 1 it is proﬁtable to segregate sub-load J. If sub-load J
is a commingle of wheat with different protein concentrations and if its mean protein
concentration is equal to lB, then on the price curve we can always ﬁnd two points, say
E and F, such that (1) E is on the left of point B and F is on the right of point B; and
(2) points E, B, and F form a convex price shape. According to Corollary 1, under this
situation segregating sub-load J is proﬁtable.
From sub-load Z we can separate out one unit of wheat with mean protein level lj
that is a mix of wheat with protein concentration lk and some wheat with mean protein
concentration lC. Exchanging this unit of mix separated from sub-load Z with one unit
wheat from sub-load J does not affect the mean protein concentrations of both sub-load
Z and sub-load J. Therefore, the total revenue is not affected by this exchange. However,
the farmer can increase her revenue by segregating the unit of mix originally from sub-
load Z but now in sub-load J. One way of the segregation is to segregate the mix into
two groups, one group has mean protein concentration at lC; the other group has mean
protein concentration at lD. The three points, C, J, and D, form a convex price schedule
(See Figure A6). Therefore, according to Corollary 1 the farmer can increase her revenue
by segregating the unit of mix.
Step 5. We have shown in Step 1 that line CD deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5 exists when
m > lA. We also have shown that there is one and only one sub-load, namely sub-load
Z, that has mean protein concentration less than lB but equal to lC in Step 2 and Step
3. In Step 4 we showed that there is no wheat with protein concentration higher than
37lD in sub-load Z, which implied that sub-load Z is a commingle of wheat with protein
concentration no higher than lD. Because wheat with protein concentration higher than
lD is under a convex price schedule and there is no commingling opportunity for such
wheat, these wheat will be completely segregated according to Proposition 1. In sum,
for the type I price schedules, when m > lA, then in the optimal arrangements wheat with
protein concentration higher than lD should be completely segregated and the remaining
wheat should be completely commingled.
Appendix B
In this appendix we prove Proposition 4.
Proof. To optimally process one load of wheat is to explore the beneﬁt of commingling
and segregating based on the information from measuring protein concentration. Once the
beneﬁt of commingling and segregating is completely obtained, the processing reaches
its optimal results. Since the farmer’s goal is to ﬁnd out the optimal q1, q2, and q3 to
maximize her revenue, the objective function maxqiå
3
i=1 piqi in problem (6) and problem
(7)iscorrect. Themajorworkofspecifyinganappropriateformofprogrammingproblem
for the farmer is to correctly dealing with the non-linear segregating property imposed by
protein concentration distribution. In this proof we show that the constraints speciﬁed in
problem (6) and problem (7) achieve this goal.
The ﬁrst three constraints in problem (6) (or problem (7)) are necessary for clear
reasons. The ﬁrst constraint says that the weight of each sub-load cannot be negative.
The second constraint says the total weight of three sub-loads sums up to one. The third
constraint indicates that the protein concentration of wheat in sub-loads S2 and S3 are
38l1 and l2, respectively (Lemma 4 and Lemma 7). It also says the total protein in three
sub-loads is equal to m, the aggregate protein in the initial load.
The last constraint in problem (6) and problem (7) is the key. When c2  l1, then
by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we have F(c1)  q1  F(c2). Therefore, the wheat not in
sub-load S1 can be seen as a commingle of wheat with protein concentration l2 and wheat






f(l)dl < l1. Then by Lemma 1
we know this commingle can be segregated into two sub-loads, one with protein con-
centration at l1 and the other with protein concentration l2. Given q1, by Lemma 7 we
know that this segregation is optimal. For each q1 2 [F(c1);F(c2)], the second and the
third constraints in problem (6) uniquely determine the optimal q2 and q3 (i.e., optimal
conditional on q1). Therefore, the non-leaner programming problem (6) will search out
the optimal q1, q2, and q3. This shows that item (i) is true. The same procedure follows
when proving item (ii).
When c2 > l1 and ˆ l1 = 0, then according to Lemma 6 we have q
1 = 0. Then in the
optimal arrangements q3 must be maximized constrained by m2  l1. By the deﬁnition






f(l)dl  l1. By Lemma 3 we know that q
3 = 1 F(c2).
Therefore, q
2 = F(c2). This concludes the proof.
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40Table 1. Results of Regressions (11) to (12) of HRW Wheat
  Regression (11)  Regression (12) 
variables  coefficients  t value coefficients t value 
const.  41.78  6.17 34.43 7.21 
sh2  -0.31 -1.66 -0.44 -3.21 
sh3  -0.42  -5.56 -0.21 -3.84 
ts  -0.19 -1.31 -0.16 -1.67 
sea1  -0.75  -0.71 -1.99 -2.64 
sea2  -2.08 -1.71 -2.31 -2.62 
sea3  0.63  0.59 -1.48 -1.98 




Table 2. Results of Regressions (11) to (12) of HRS Wheat 
   Regression (11)  Regression (12) 
variables coefficients  t  value coefficients t  value 
const.  47.60  3.45  116.27  3.21 
sh2  -0.32 -1.29 -1.38 -1.98 
sh3  -0.53  -3.28  -1.54  -3.72 
ts  0.24 0.53 1.48 0.84 
sea1  -3.88  -2.81  -5.28  -1.19 
sea2  -3.28 -2.06 -9.98 -1.99 
sea3  -0.99  -0.73  3.04  0.68 










41Table 3. Trial Locations and Names of Top Varieties  
of HRW Wheat in the State of Washington 
Locations 
(1) Almira  
(2) Bickleton  
(3) Connell 











(14) St andrews 
(15) Walla walla 
Varieties 
(1) Agripro paladin 
(2) Bauermeister (1) 
(3) Boundary  
(4) Buchanan 
(5) Columbia – 1 
(6) Declo 
(7) Eddy 
(8) Estica  
(9) Finley  
(10) Hatton 
(11) Quantum hybrid   
542 
(12) Residence 
(13) Semper  






Table 4. Summary Statistics of HRW Wheat Testing Results 
(Observations: 538) 
  Mean  Variance  Maximum  Minimum 
Protein  11.87%  2.88   10   16.6% 7.40% 
Yield (bu/acre)  63.25  1.06   10   165.90  9.90 
Test Weight 












42Table 5. Results of Regression (14) 
variable  coefficient  t value  variable  coefficient  t value 
constant  0.1153 22.6973  variety10  -0.0084 -1.8672 
year2  -0.0165  -6.5310  variety11  -0.0033  -0.7456 
year3  0.0038 1.3690  variety12  -0.0102 -1.9260 
year4  -0.0042  -1.3678  variety13  -0.0082  -1.5482 
year5  0.0137 5.4812  variety14  -0.0011 -0.2564 
year6  0.0028  1.0606  variety15  -0.0058  -1.1062 
year7  -0.0034 -1.2555  variety16  0.0016 0.3564 
year8  0.0080  2.9421  location2  -0.0184  -6.3658 
year9  -0.0007 -0.2265  location3  0.0088 3.5184 
year10  0.0052  1.7054  location4  -0.0006  -0.1847 
year11  0.0127 3.9615  location5  0.0004 0.1355 
year12  0.0145  4.6577  location6  0.0067  1.2968 
year13  0.0099 3.1529  location7  0.0119 3.0240 
variety2  -0.0095  -2.2997  location8  0.0209  8.8342 
variety3  -0.0079 -1.9563  location9  -0.0080 -2.4570 
variety4  -0.0141  -3.2322  location10  0.0150  6.3996 
variety5  0.0002 0.0295  location11  0.0015 0.6535 
variety6  0.0007  0.1719  location12  0.0059  1.8062 
variety7  -0.0033 -0.8035  location13  0.0035 1.3373 
variety8  -0.0089  -1.9462  location14  -0.0105  -4.4670 













43Table 6. Coefficients of Regression (15)  
variable  coefficient  t value  variable  coefficient  t value 
constant  0.1185 43.57  location2  0.0067 1.82 
year2  0.0051  2.77  location3  0.0055  1.11 
year3  0.0148 7.72  location4  0.0039 1.79 
year4  0.0233  11.44  location5  0.0202  8.54 
year5  0.0318 15.41  location6  0.0031 1.48 
year6  0.0357  17.19  location7  0.0073  3.13 
year7  0.0321 15.43  location8  0.0084 2.67 
year8  0.0350  17.72  location9  -0.0135  -5.83 
year9  0.0400 19.79  location10  0.0006 0.27 
year10  0.0332  16.53  location11  0.0130  6.27 
year11  0.0344 16.34  location12  0.0033 1.59 
year12  0.0356  17.07  location13  0.0165  5.27 
year13  0.0381 18.37  location14  0.0234 7.25 
variety2  -0.0060  -2.72  location15  0.0090  3.34 
variety3  -0.0100 -2.93  location16  0.0259 9.24 
variety4  -0.0105  -3.86  location17  -0.0007  -0.32 
variety5  -0.0089 -5.28  location18  0.0083 3.19 
variety6  -0.0035  -1.97  location19  0.0107  3.56 
variety7  -0.0062 -2.39  location20  -0.0008 -0.37 
variety8  -0.0096  -5.79  location21  0.0058  1.21 
variety9  0.0040 1.54  location22  0.0061 2.93 
variety10  -0.0005  -0.13  location23  -0.0029  -1.31 
variety11  -0.0114 -6.85  location24  0.0158 6.13 
variety12  -0.0097  -4.09  location25  0.0144  5.04 
variety13  -0.0080 -4.44  location26  0.0010 0.50 
variety14  -0.0043  -2.48  location27  0.0059  1.54 









44Table 7. Results of Regression (16)  
variables  coefficient  t value 
const  11.58 20.68 
b  0.43  36.08 
R_square: 0.94 












Figure 1a. Price Schedule which Turns from 










Figure 1b. Price Schedule which Turns from 
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Figure 10. WTPs of HRW Wheat Farmers if the Sorting 



































































































































































































Figure 11. WTPs of HRS Wheat Farmers if the Sorting 
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